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Uniqueness thesis theorists and permissivist have disputes on whether two epistemic peers can have reasonable disagreement when given a body of evidence. In this paper, I am going to explain the Uniqueness Thesis proposed by Richard Feldman in “Reasonable Religious Disagreements” and the Permissivism Miriam Schoenfield provides in “Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism Is True and What It Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief.” After examine the two opposite theories, I will explain how they see starting points (epistemic standards) differently and some limitations on their view on agent’s starting point.
In “Reasonable Religious Disagreements”, Feldman attempts to provide answers to the following two questions:

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Can Epistemic Peers who have shared their evidence have Reasonable Disagreements?
Can epistemic peers who have shared their evidence reasonably maintain their own belief yet also think that the other party to the disagreement is also reasonable?

Feldman proposed the uniqueness thesis which identifies the relationship between evidence and proposition. A body of evidence can stand in a justified relationship to only one of a group of mutually exclusive propositions. It can justify at the most one proposition out of a competing set and it justifies at most one attitude toward any particular proposition. In addition, only one of three epistemic attitudes towards a proposition can be justified by a given body of evidence: belief, disbelief, or suspension of judgment.
When there are two agents who are epistemic peers and share the same evidence, it would be impossible for the two agents to reach a conclusion that contradicts each other if they are given the same body of evidence. From a body of evidence, agents cannot draw conflicting conclusion. With a set of mutually exclusive proposition only the rational agent would only be able to form belief on one of the proposition.
To Feldman, two people can reasonably disagree, but never when the evidence is fully shared between epistemic peers. In cases where there seems to be a reasonable disagreement, at least one party would have to be withholding evidence or be making a mistake in applying his epistemic standards. How Feldman uses the term evidence need to be specified here. Usually when we think of evidence, we imagine a courtroom and exhibits. In a courtroom, a document, the testimony of an eye-witness, or a ballistics report might be considered evidence.  This is not synonymous with Feldman’s definition of evidence. He writes about evidence as reason for believing something. It refers to all the reasons an agent has for forming a attitude toward a proposition. An agent’s past experience, or upbringing background would be counted as evidence. The various memories, conceptualizations, and impressions we have make up our reasons for believing things, and thus are our bodies of evidence, according Feldman. To rule out reasonable disagreement, all the relevant evidence must be shared.
Disagreement occur between epistemic peers due to difference in standards. Feldman asserts that in a situation where two agents have the different starting points, they are obliged to identify their own starting points and how their starting points influence their judgement on the given body of evidence. 
Feldman states on page 206, “Once people have engaged in a full discussion of issues, their different starting points will be apparent. And then those claims will themselves be open for discussion and evaluation. These different starting points help to support the existence of reasonable disagreements only if each side can reasonably maintain its starting point after they have been brought out into the open…. Once you see that there are these alternative starting points, you need a reason to prefer one over the other (2007).”
Hence, for an agent adhere to evidential standard must be supported by reasons The two agents need to come to consensus on the same set of starting point and proceed to form the attitude towards proposition using the same starting points.   
Schonefield rejects Feldman entirely by claiming that Permissivism is True. Permissivism requires that we accept that our beliefs are, in a sense, arbitrary no matter what – there were a bunch of rational options and we ended up with one rather than another for some arbitrary reason. Given this, learning that our beliefs came about arbitrarily in some particular way, shouldn’t make a difference, as long as we know that the belief we ended up with is one of the rational ones. She points out Epistemic standard same as  what counts as reason for you. It doesn’t make sense to provide reasons for epistemic standards. Epistemic standards are not the kind to thing which there can be reason. To Schonefield arbitrariness here is a built in feature of the theory not an objection.
“It is not just in scientific contexts in which it seems that people can reasonably arrive at different conclusions on the basis of the same body of evidence. We can imagine cases in which members of a jury are examining a complex body of evidence about who committed a crime, or people considering the evidence for and against the effectiveness of acupuncture, or the existence of God. In these cases too it seems that people may rationally come to different conclusions on the basis of a shared body of evidence (196).” — background information is a part of agent’s total evidence
Difference in total evidence always lead to reasonable disagreement 
Feldman would not say that “all evidence must be shared.” Rather, Feldman argues that all the evidence relevant to the disagreement at hand must be shared. How do we know what evidence is and is not relevant? Relevant evidence should (epistemically speaking, not morally) influence an attitude towards the belief it is relevant to, whereas evidence that is not relevant should not. The obvious question becomes: how do we tell the difference? Here I draw a distinction between reasons and causes. It would be a mistake to conflate the two because they are not always synonymous, and Feldman is writing strictly about “reasons”. For example, consider a girl who forms a belief about God. She forms the belief due to the outside influences of her society, culture and family. When asked about her belief, she cannot name any reasons for holding the belief or cite any evidence for the belief. By her own admission, the belief was caused by forces  outside of herself. It would be safe to call her family, culture and society the causes of her belief, but not fair to call them her reasons for belief. Reasons are more than a simple causal relationship between a belief and its origin – they have justifications and indicate that a belief is true, while causes merely explain the fact of how the belief originated. Feldman, therefore, writes about reasons, not causes.